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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On July 21, 2004, attorneys general from eight states filed
a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York against five of the largest electric utility
companies in the country.' The suit claims that the carbon dioxide
("C0 2") emissions from the companies' plants constitute a public
nuisance because CO 2 contributes to global warming.2 The suit
does not seek monetary compensation from the utility companies,
but it does demand that the court order the companies to reduce
their CO 2 emissions by a recommended amount of three percent
annually for the next ten years.3
The suit claims that the named utility companies have
"practical, feasible, and economically viable options for reducing
CO 2 emissions without significantlyincreasing the cost of electricity
to their customers."4 These options include "changing fuels, improving efficiency, increasing generation from zero- or low-carbon
energy sources such as wind, solar, and gasified coal with emissions
capture, co-firing wood or other biomass in coal plants, employing
demand-side management techniques, altering the dispatch order
of their plants, and other measures. '

' See Press Release, Office of the State of California Attorney General, Attorney
General Lockyer Files Lawsuit to Reduce Global Warming Emissions from Five
Largest Polluters (July 21, 2004) [hereinafter Press Release], http://ag.ca.gov/
newsalerts/2004/04-076.htm. The Attorneys General filing suit were: Bill
Lockyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Tom Miller of Iowa,
Peter C. Harvey of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Patrick C. Lynch of
Rhode Island, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Peg Lautenschlager of
Wisconsin. Id. The suit also was joined by New York City. Id. The utility
companies named in the complaint were: American Electric Power Company,
Inc. ("AEP"), AEP Service Corporation (a wholly owned AEP subsidiary),
Southern Company, Xcel Energy, Cinergy Corporation, and the Tennessee Valley
Authority ("TVA"). Id.
2Jonathan A. Lesser, The AGs'Global Warming Suits: Regulation by Litigation,
142 PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY 24 (2004).
3Id.
4Id.
5

Id.
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The utility companies have responded with a motion to
dismiss the case. 6 However, the attorneys general are not discouraged by a motion to dismiss which they already had expected.7 The
plaintiffs intend to proceed with a lawsuit that they feel "makes
clear and compelling claims under well-established federal law."'
This Note argues that the courts are not the proper forum
for resolving the complex question of CO 2 regulation.9 Part I
addresses the ongoing debate over the actual impact of CO 2 on the
environment-specifically, the impact that emissions by the named
power companies are having on global temperatures." There is
sufficient scientific evidence to support the theory that CO 2
emissions more likely than not cause global warming;" however,
it is doubtful that limiting the emissions of these five utility
12
companies would even slow the current warming trend.
Part III of this Note covers the impact that the regulation
proposed in the lawsuit would have on the industry, labor, and
financial development of the states that rely on power from the
defendant power companies. 3 In effect, the law suit would shift
the costs of transforming coal-based industry to a few states and
4
a small group of investors.'
Whether to regulate CO 2 emissions by the utility companies
named in the suit is a complex question that requires a determination of the actual harms caused by emissions from these

6 Suzanna

Strangmeier, PollutionDebate Heating Up over NSR Rules, NAT. GAS
WK., Oct. 18, 2004; see also CinergyFightsEmissions Suits, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Oct. 1, 2004, at 2F (stating that Cinergy has attacked the plaintiffs' case as
lacking harms "immediate enough to merit litigation").
' Climate Change; Utilities Seek to Dismiss C02 Lawsuit, GREENWIRE, Oct. 1,
2004, http.www.eenews.net/subscriber/search/swishe-search.cgi (subscription
required for access).
8Id. (quoting Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal).
9 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
'oSee

discussion infra Part I.B.

1'See discussion infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
12

13

14

See discussion infra Part I.D.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See Lesser, supranote 2, at 24.
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companies. Additionally, the policy considerations must include
weighing the benefits of limiting the emissions against the costs
that such regulation will place on the companies and on the
affected states. The complexity of the issue, the differing interests
of all the states involved, and the international policy implications
make this a topic that is too broad for resolution in the courtroom; 15
the debate belongs in the legislative arena.
CARBON DIOXIDE AND GLOBAL WARMING

I.

The lawsuit alleges that emissions by the named utility
companies must be regulated to prevent harm to public health and
welfare. 6 However, the utility companies contend that they have
not operated their power plants in any way that is unlawful.' 7
Power plant CO 2 emissions are not regulated by the 1990 Clean
Air Act or any other legislation.'" The utilities further contend that
the alleged hazards of CO2 emissions by the utility companies are
undermined by the fact that all animals, including humans, emit
CO 2 when they exhale.' 9
A.

The Alleged Harms of CarbonDioxide

Plaintiffs do not claim that C0 2 is itself directly hazardous
to the population, but rather that its uncontrolled emission leads
to global warming. 2° The buildup of CO 2 gases in the atmosphere
'5

See discussion infra Part IV.A.

16

See Press Release, supra note 1.

See Lesser, supra note 2, at 24.
'5 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000). But see Miguel Bustillo, States to Sue over
Global Warming;Californiaand Seven Others, Unhappy with U.S. Policies,Say
the Carbon Dioxide from Five Energy Producers Is a 'Public Nuisance,' L.A.
TIMEs, July 21, 2004, at B8 (noting that eleven states and fourteen
environmental groups are challenging in federal court the non-pollutant
classification of CO 2 in 2003 by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
9
David J. Owsiany, Suits Against Utility CompaniesAre PoliticsHidingBehind
Health Issues, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 23, 2004, at 11A.
2 Press Release, supra note 1.
'7
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trap some of the sun's radiation reflected by the Earth in the
same way that glass panels do in a greenhouse.2 1 The "speed and
magnitude of global warming" have been linked to the "level of
carbon dioxide emissions."22
Climate researchers claim that there is a global warming
trend and that this is due to human activity. 23 The average surface
temperature has increased by one degree Fahrenheit over the past
century, and it is predicted to rise between 2.2 and ten degrees in
the next one hundred years if left unchecked. 24 The difference
between current temperatures and those during the last ice age is
only seven to eleven degrees.25
According to the suit, the one degree rise in average temperature already has caused shrinking of the Artic Sea ice, the loss
of two-thirds of the glaciers in Glacier National Park in Montana,
and the death of coral reefs.26 Some also blame the one degree rise

21

Chris Bowman, Landmark Emissions Lawsuit; California, 7 Other States

Wield Nuisance Laws, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 22, 2004, at A3.
Press Release, supra note 1; see also Bustillo, supra note 18 (noting that the
National Academy of Sciences, the American Meteorological Society, and
"numerous other scientific organizations" have supported the position); NASA2005 Could Be Warmest Year Recorded, REUTERS, Feb. 10, 2005 (quoting James
Hansen of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space studies who claims that the
warming trend over the last thirty years is "due primarily to increasing
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere" and that carbon dioxide is the most common
of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere), available at http://www.public
broadcasting.net/wrvo/news.newsmain?action=article&ARTICLEID=737855.
23 Mark Clayton, In Hot Pursuit of Polluters,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
19,
2004, at 15 (citing a statement by Anthony Broccoli, a climate researcher at
Rutgers University's Cook College in New Brunswick, New Jersey), availableat
2004 WL 58696320.
24 Id.; see also William H. Sorrell, Commentary, Stepping in to Curb Pollution
when U.S. Government Won't: N.J. Joins 7 States, N.Y City in Suit Seeking
Reduced C02 Emissions, 178 N.J. L.J. 23 (2004) (citing the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change as projecting an average temperature rise as large as
ten degrees by the end of the century).
25 Dan Shapley, 8 States, NYC Sue Power Plants over Carbon Dioxide,
POUGHKEEPSIE J., July 22, 2004, at Al.
2' Leonard Post, Power Companies Feel the Heat: Eight States and NYC
Sue
Power Companies over Global Warming, 26 NAT'L L.J. 4, (2004).
22
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in temperature for the global sea level rise of four to eight inches
over the past century, 27 and for the fact that 1998 was "the hottest
year [on record] ... since thermometer records began in 1861...
with 2002 and 2003 tied for second warmest. '' 28 But the complaint
is not limited to the current harms of global warming; 29 it also
states that the eventual impacts of global warming will be
"increasing asthma and heat-related illnesses, eroding shorelines,
floods and other natural disasters, loss of forests and other
precious resources. 3 °

23.
Sorrell, supra note 24 (adding that the "five hottest years have all occurred
since 1997 and the 10 hottest since 1990"); see also NASA, supranote 22 (stating
that 2004 was the fourth warmest recorded year and that 2005 is expected by
some to be warmer than 2004, "and perhaps even warmer than 1998, which had
stood out as far hotter than any year in the preceding century").
29 The global ills claimed by the attorneys general include
(1) a rise in deaths directly attributable to intensified and
prolonged heat waves; (2) increased levels of smog, and the
resulting upsurge in respiratory problems such as asthma; (3)
rising sea levels, which can cause beach erosion, inundation of
coastal land, and salinization of water supplies; (4) water shortages associated with a reduction of snow pack in the mountains
of California; (5) lowered water levels in the Great Lakes, which
negatively impacts commercial shipping, recreational harbors
and marinas, and hydropower generation; (6) an increase in
droughts and floods nationwide, which may result in property
damage and pose a hazard to human safety; and (7) a widespread loss of species and biodiversity.
Eight States and New York City Sue Five Power Producersover GreenhouseGas
Emissions, FOSTER ELEC. REP., July 28, 2004, at 10; see also Chris Bowman,
California Joins 8-State Lawsuit to Fight Utilities' Global Warming Gasses,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 21, 2004, at Al (noting specific harms for California,
which include more frequent wildfires and contamination of water delivered to
twenty million Californians); Shapley, supra note 25 (citing harms specifically
claimed by the state of New York based on a recent study conducted by Columbia
University's Mailman School of Public Health and its Earth Institute).
" Robert Samuelson, Editorial, Attorney Generals'HotAir, WASH. POST, Aug. 11,
2004, at A21.
27 Clayton, supra note
28
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Global Impact of Defendants' Emissions

Plaintiffs allege that the five utility companies targeted in
the lawsuit control twenty-five operating companies and 174 power
plants in twenty states. 31 Those 174 plants emit nearly 650 million
tons of CO 2 each year.3 2 The five companies account for one fourth
of all U.S. power plant CO 2 emissions, or ten percent of the country's total CO 2 production. 33 Even at the levels of CO 2 emissions
that are alleged by the plaintiffs, the named utility companies only
account for two percent of all global CO 2 emissions.34
C.

Mitigation of Harms by Defendants

Despite the seemingly large quantities of CO 2 emissions
alleged by the plaintiffs, the U.S. Department of Energy reports
that the level of energy-related emissions for 2003 only increased
by 0.9% and that it was still below the amount registered for
2000.3 ' This stabilization of the CO 2 output is due in part to the
power industry's self-imposed caps on emissions and programs to
reduce CO 2 production.36

31

Greenhouse Polluters Face the Law: Top Cops Bring the FightAgainst Global

Warming to a New Battleground, ONEARTH, Sept. 22, 2004, at 42; see also
OUTLOOK, July 26, 2004, at 13 (noting that
the suit charges that AEP's plants emitted 226 million tons of CO 2; Southern
emitted 171 million tons; TVA, 171 million; Xcel, 75 million; and Cinergy, 70
million).
32 Sorrell, supra note 24.
3

States Sue over C02, PLATT's COAL

3

34

id.

See Lesser, supranote 2, at 26.

" Op-Ed., Politics Drives Emissions Lawsuit; It's Ludicrous to Prosecuteyour
Local Power Company for CausingGlobal Climate Change, WIS. ST. J., July 22,
2004, at A18; see also John Woolfolk, States Use Public Nuisance Law to Sue
Companies over Emissions, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 22, 2004 (noting
that AEP claims that its emissions were overstated at 220 million annual tons
instead of 170).
316See Woolfolk, supra note 35.
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AEP has agreed to cap greenhouse gas emissions in Chicago
and to reduce those gases ten percent by 2006;31 Xcel is working
towards developing alternative power sources;"8 and Cinergy has
pledged that it will spend $21 million to return its greenhouse gas
emissions to five percent below 2000 levels for 2010 through
2012. 39 All five utility companies are involved in self-imposed
programs to reduce or offset emissions.4"
Utility companies do not believe that it is necessary to
impose outside requirements for emission reduction because
efficiency and cost reduction already provide the necessary
incentive to control the emissions. A chief executive of British
Petroleum ("BP"), John Browne, noted that his company saved
$50 million through cutting emissions by ten percent through the
elimination of leaks and waste.41 The companies sued by the
attorneys general claim that such actions detract resources and
attention from voluntary activities that are already undertaken by

" Id.; see also Pam Kasey, Lawsuit Targets Utilities,Alleges Global Warming, 20
STATE J., Aug. 13, 2004, at 4.
s Politics Drives Emissions Lawsuit, supra note 35.
3 Bruce Geiselman, Eyes on the Five; States File Lawsuit Against 5 Utilities,
WASTE NEWS, Aug. 2, 2004, at 1; see also Anthony Schoettle, Cinergy Named in
FederalSuit, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 3, 39 (noting that Cinergy
has undertaken three planting projects in three states and that it has spent $200
million to convert one power plant from coal to a combined-cycle technology,
which provides power more efficiently by recapturing the exhaust).
40 See Woolfolk, supra note 35 (stating that Southern is involved in developing
technology to reduce coal-burning emissions; that Xcel, the nation's second
largest wind-power generator, plans to triple its windpower generation by 2012,
and has spent $1.2 billion to reduce emissions from a number of its power plants;
and that the TVA is purchasing wind-power and modernizing its hydroelectric
power plants to reduce emissions); see also Eight States and New York City Sue,
supranote 29 (explaining that electric utilities and the U.S. Department of Energy
have created a voluntary program, Climate Challenge, to avoid or sequester the
equivalent of 281 million tons of CO, in 2002 alone, and that many of the
companies have also agreed to reduce carbon intensity by three to five percent in
their power plants over the next decade); Chris Serres, Eight States,NYC Sue Xcel,
4 Others, STAR TRIB., July 22, 2004, at ID (claiming that Xcel has committed to
reduce CO, emissions by twelve million tons by 2009).
41

War Between the States on Climate, TAMPA

TRIB.,

Aug. 3, 2004, at 10.
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the utility companies.42 Steve Brash, a spokesman for Cinergy, has
stated that the efforts of the attorneys general should be redirected
towards "other industries that aren't making commitments."43
However, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has
stated that "[v]oluntary actions so far have been inadequate,
inconsequential."" In fact, Spitzer has characterized power
utilities as inactive toward emission reduction when compared to
the efforts being made by the international community and by
individual U.S. states.4 5 The voluntary reductions of three to five
percent over the next decade certainly pale in comparison to the
lawsuit's demand for three percent annual reductions over the next
ten years, which will amount to a twenty-six percent reduction in
emissions in the next decade.
D.

Impact of Emission Reduction by Defendants

In addition to contesting that the harms of global warming
can be attributed to CO 2 emissions, the utility companies claim
that regulating their emissions will not remedy the situation.46
Despite their own efforts to reduce CO 2 emissions, the utility
companies point out that scientific data has not conclusively linked
CO 2 emissions to global warming.47 Although CO 2 concentration
rapidly increased after 1940, there was a decrease in the temperature record for thirty-seven years until 1997, when it slowly

See Kasey, supra note 37 (quoting Melissa McHenry, an AEP spokeswoman).
4' Brian Stempeck, Climate Change; State Attorneys to File C02 Emissions Suit
Today, GREENWIRE, July 21, 2004, http.www.eenews.net/subscriber/searchlswishesearch.cgi (subscription required for access).
44 Brian Stempeck, Climate Change;States' Lawsuit Demands Utilities Reduce
C02 Emissions 3 Percent Per Year, GREENWIRE, July 22, 2004 (quoting Eliot
Spitzer, New York Attorney General), http.www.eenews.net/subscriber/search/
swishe-search.cgi
(subscription required for access).
45
42

Id.

See Joe Truini, UtilitiesMove to Dismiss Suit, 10 WASTE NEwS 3 (2004).
Owsiany, supranote 19; see also New York's Greenhouse Gasbags,N.Y. POST,
Aug. 2, 2004, at 30 (pointing to significant evidence that climate change is driven
by sunspot activity).
46

41
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recovered.4' Additionally, other studies claim that CO 2 is only a
minor greenhouse gas. 9
Even if CO 2 emissions can be shown to cause global warming, plaintiffs also must show that the utility companies contribute
to the problem. The defendants can point to the fact that CO 2 is
naturally emitted by all animals and even volcanoes.5 ° Planetary
deforestation has been blamed for twenty-five percent of total CO 2
emissions and motor vehicles for an additional thirty-three
percent. 5 The Ohio Attorney General, Jim Petro, refused to join
the lawsuit which included two companies based in Ohio. Attorney
General Petro cited 1999 data reflecting that California motor
vehicles emitted eighty percent more CO 2 than Ohio's entire utility
industry.52 A significant change in CO 2 emissions would require "a
larger social and political solution, not a narrow legal one."53
If upheld, the recommendation of the lawsuit against the
power companies would be insignificant. With a contribution of two
percent of the global emissions, an annual reduction of three
percent would decrease worldwide emissions of CO 2 by less than
one-tenth of one percent.54 Even if the companies completely
rate rise
eliminate all CO 2 emissions, the current global emission
55
of two percent annually would offset the entire cut.
48

John McClaughry, Another Carbon Dioxide Lawsuit Travesty, BURLINGTON

FREE PRESS, Aug. 7, 2004, at 9 (claiming that tropospheric, satellite temperature
readings reflect a one degree increase by 2100 at most).
" "The main absorbers of infrared in the atmosphere are water vapor and clouds.
Even if all other greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide and methane) were
to disappear, we would still be left with over 98 percent of the current
greenhouse effect." Id. (quoting Richard Lindzen, Sloan Professor of Meteorological Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
50 Owsiany, supra note 19.
5,Ohio's Attorney GeneralSays

State Will Not Join Global WarmingSuit Against
Utilities, FOSTER ELEC.REP., Aug. 4, 2004, at 14.

52Id. (citing an

additional report by traffic engineers at Texas A&M University,
which concluded that traffic gridlock in Los Angeles and New York City
produced 7.5 million tons of CO 2 emissions in 1996).
5'Editorial,

Global Warming Lawsuit Is a Long Shot; The Real Solution Is
Social, Not Legal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 22, 2004, at 8B.
54Lesser, supra note 2, at 26.
55 Samuelson, supra 30; see also Lesser, supra note 2, at 26.
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The utility companies emphasize the growth in developing
countries which will soon drive those countries' greenhouse gas
emissions above those of the U.S. and other industrialized
nations."6 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which
has projected that greenhouse emissions will more than triple
during this century, attributes virtually all of the increase to
developing countries.57
For these reasons, the utility companies have emphasized
that any action must be international and include developing
countries.5" One such proposed global cooperative plan is the Kyoto
Protocol. However, the unwillingness of developing countries, such
as China and India, to join will undermine the Protocol's effectiveness.59 The failure to incorporate developing countries would have
led to rising emissions even if the U.S. had adopted the Protocol. °
Despite all this, the attorneys general contend that the
recommended reduction by the defendants would "achieve [defendants'] share of the carbon dioxide emission reductions necessary
to significantly slow the rate and magnitude of warming."6 1 Policy
director of the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"),
Eight States andNew York City Sue, supranote 29; see also Applying the Heat,
NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 23, 2004, at A10 (singling out China and India as
growing polluters).
" Samuelson, supranote 30 (explaining that emissions by developing countries
would offset even tough anti-global warming polices by the U.S. and other
industrial countries).
58 Dan Fagin, New York City, 8 States Sue Power Firmsin Bid to Cut Pollution,
NEWSDAY, July 22, 2004, at A18. Pat Hemlipp, an AEP spokesman said "[A]ny
effort on climate change has to be global and has to include developing nations,
so that any economic pain is shared globally." Id.; see also Eight States and New
York City Sue, supra note 29 (quoting the president of the Edison Electric
Institute ("EEI"), Thomas Kuhn, as stating that "any response.., must allow
time for the development of technologies capable of reducing greenhouses gases
and.., ensure that these technologies are deployed globally").
'9Samuelson, supra note 30 (emphasizing that mass poverty forces those
countries to focus more on increasing economic growth than on slowing global
warming).
60 Id.
(noting that the shortcoming led to the Senate passing a completely
unanimous resolution in 1997 against the Kyoto Protocol).
61 Eight States and New York City Sue, supra note 29.
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David Doniger, explains that, although it is true that a significant
solution requires international action, such a resolution could be
effected if the defendants' companies "supported real limits on
global warming pollution."62
Although the attorneys general appear content with
bringing publicity to the issue of global warming,6" even this goal
of the litigation has been widely criticized as misguided. The action
by the eight Democratic attorneys general has been characterized
as an election-year "publicity stunt."' This has not discouraged the
attorneys general from pursuing regulation of the defendants
through the doctrine of public nuisance.
II.

DEFINING GLOBAL WARMING AS A PUBLIC NUISANCE

A.

PublicNuisance Defined
In order to constitute a public nuisance, the alleged harms

must constitute an "'unreasonable' interference with rights common

to all members of a community."65 The 'unreasonable interference'

62

Greenhouse Polluters Face the Law, supra note 31 (referring to NRDC's

parallel suit against the five utility companies and on behalf of the Audubon
Society of New Hampshire and the New York-based Open Space Institute).
63 Schoettle, supra note 39, at 39 (quoting Marc Violette, a spokesman for the
New York Attorney General). Violette said, "This suit will for the first time put
global warming on the litigation map." Id.
' Truini, supranote 46 (quoting the characterization of the lawsuit by Cinergy's
chief legal officer, Marc E. Manly).
6 Robert A. Levy, Public Nuisance, N.Y. SUN, Aug. 24, 2004, available at 2004
WL 82589951; see also Eight States and New York City Sue, supra note 29
(defining public nuisance doctrine as a prohibition from "engaging in a course of
conduct that interferes with the legal rights of others by causing damage,
annoyance, or inconvenience"); Jonathan Martel et al., Power Plants,
Particulates,and the UncertainScience of Public Health, 18 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 31, 37 (2004) (emphasizing the requirement that the defendants' conduct
must be shown to be unreasonable); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman,
Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individualsin Law and Economics,92 CAL.
L. REV. 75, 99 (2004) (noting that a public nuisance "arises from an invasion of
a public right").
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may consist of a lawful activity "but so negligently or carelessly
done or permitted as to create a potential and unreasonable risk of
harm which, in due course, results in injury to another.""6
The invasion of another's interests "in the use and enjoyment of land" is considered unreasonable if "(a) the gravity of the
harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct, or (b) the harm
caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of
compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make
the continuation of the conduct not feasible."67 This common law
rule specifically applies to conduct that constitutes a private
nuisance. However, statutes governing public nuisances "usually
have been interpreted to carry over this rule from the common
law."6 " For a public nuisance to be actionable under common law,
it also is necessary for the "interference with the public interest"
to be unreasonable.69 The mere fact that the invasion is intentional
does not make it unreasonable; 7° a policy analysis of benefits
versus harms is needed to determine the reasonableness of the
interference. 7 '
A plaintiff in a public nuisance action may seek injunctive
relief or monetary compensation for damages.72 Generally, a court
will grant an injunction only "if damages could not adequately

66

Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 100.

67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 826 (1979); see also § 829 (defining an

intentional invasion of "another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land" as
unreasonable "if the harm resulting from the invasion is severe and greater than
the other should be required to bear without compensation").
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. a (1979).
69 Id.
7
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. b (1979).
71 Id. (noting that
"[m]any invasions.., can be justified as reasonable although
the actor knows that they are resulting or are substantially certain to result from
his conduct ....[The unreasonableness of intentional invasions is a problem of
relative values ....
"); § 826 cmt. a (explaining that an interference with the public
interest is unreasonable, and therefore a public nuisance, when "its utility is
outweighed by the gravity of the interference with the public right").
72 Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 102.
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redress the injury. However, courts are more likely to enjoin the
interfering activity when a nuisance affects public "health and
comfort,"74 as is allegedly the case in the present action.
B.

HistoricalApplication of the Public Nuisance Doctrine

The doctrine of public nuisance provides that "if an entity's
activities in one state are causing harm in another, the state
suffering harm may sue to halt the injurious conduct."75 States
have used this law to resolve local and interstate pollution
disputes involving sewage, acid rain, and tobacco smoke.76 The
California Supreme Court upheld an injunction against a hydraulic
mining company in 1884, when farmers complained that the silt
sent downstream by the mine "ruined water quality, impeded
navigation and raised flood danger."77 More recently, California
public nuisance law enabled the South Tahoe Public Utility to force
oil companies to clean up contamination of Lake Tahoe caused by
the gasoline additive MTBE.78
In 2003, land owners sued the companies that had operated
a federal plant for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. 79 The
plaintiffs claimed that violations of federal nuclear regulatory
provisions were actionable under a private nuisance claim, and the
federal district court agreed."0
The U.S. Supreme Court has also enforced the common law
doctrine of public and private nuisance. In 1909, the Court upheld
the state of Georgia's claim of damages and injunctive relief
arising from air pollution from a smelting plant in Tennessee."'
73 Id.

at 103 (noting that the damages are determined by "the impaired value of
the use of the premises").

74Id.

71Sorrell, supra note 24.
76 Bowman, supra note 21.
77Woolfolk, supra note 35.
78

71

Bustillo, supra note 18.

Cook v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (D. Colo. 2003).

80 Id.
81

Woolfolk, supra note 35.
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Global Warming as a Public Nuisance

The CO 2 suit will be the first to attempt to extend the public
nuisance doctrine to a global environmental issue.8 2 However, the
theory behind the claims is no different in principle. Connecticut
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal has likened this case to the
claims made by several states against tobacco companies, based on
the burden placed on public health care systems by tobacco-related
illnesses.8 3
Specifically, the suit claims that the defendants' contributions to global warming "constitute a substantial and unreasonable
interference with public rights in the plaintiffs' jurisdictions,
including . . . the right to public comfort and safety, the right to
protection of vital natural resources and public property, and the
right to use, enjoy, and preserve the aesthetic and ecological values
of the natural world. 8 4
D.

Proofof Public Nuisance Harms

Although there are difficulties in proving that the defendants' actions significantly contribute to global warming and the
alleged harms, 5 the plaintiffs will be aided by the relatively low
required burden of proof: the preponderance of the evidence
standard. All the attorneys general need to establish is that there
is a greater than fifty percent chance that the emissions of the
defendants constitute harmful public nuisances.8 6 One of the
NRDC lawyers, Matt Pawa, believes that the evidence certainly is
conclusive enough to establish a preponderance of the evidence and
82

Bowman, supra note 21.

3'As

in tobacco, we have here a uniquely dangerous and urgent health threat,'

giving states 'an opportunity to shake up and reshape the way an industry
does business."' Stempeck, supra note 44 (quoting Blumenthal).
84 Eight States and New York City Sue, supra note 29; see also Bowman, supra
note 21.
85 See discussion supra Part I.D.
86 Clayton, supra note 23 (noting that the vast majority of scientists agree that
...

carbon dioxide is the main cause of a genuine global warming trend).
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that "[s]cientists are well beyond 50 percent certain that CO 2
emissions cause global warming."8'
The difficulty in establishing damages for the plaintiffs is
that the suit claims that average temperature rises due to global
warming in their respective areas are two to four degrees, instead
of the global average of one degree. This will not be an easy claim
to prove because current computer models of climate change are
not as accurate for predicting regional or state-wide warming
impacts.8 s The case for harms of global warming becomes more
vulnerable when the plaintiffs attempt to demonstrate the actual
harms to their specific state. s9 However, plaintiffs are confident
that some of the harms, such as the recorded sea level rise in and
around New York City, will not be difficult to prove. 90
The second hurdle for the plaintiffs will be to prove that the
substantial harm to the public welfare and health was caused by
the utilities either negligently or knowingly. 9 This will focus the
debate on whether the actions of the defendants were unreasonable.9 2 To determine the reasonableness of the alleged interference
by the power companies, it will be necessary to consider the impact
of imposing limits on the utility companies, and to weigh that cost
against the harm to public interests.9 3
E.

Use of the Public Nuisance Doctrine to Address Global
Warming

Prior to passage of the Clean Air Act94 and the Clean Water
Act,95 the environmental movement made frequent use of the public
87 id.
88 Id.

9Id.(explaining

that models are relatively good for large areas like Northern or

Southern Europe but not for smaller areas).
90 Id.
91 Id.

92

See discussion supra Part I.D.

93 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
94 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
9 42 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
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nuisance doctrine developed through common law. ss Although
nuisance claims decreased drastically with passage of these acts,
the mid-1980s witnessed a rebirth of the attacks when businesses
97
and administration officials found loopholes in the regulations.
Although it is hard to establish a case against CO 2 emissions
by utility companies when the federal government chooses not to
regulate the gas,98 supporters of the lawsuit claim that the common
law remedy of public nuisance is "strongest when the laws enacted
by government are either nonexistent or ineffectively enforced."99
The doctrine is not evoked as often as it was in the 1960s, but it
still is a powerful tool "to fill the gaps in statutory protection."' 0
Proponents of the lawsuit justify legal action with an attack
on the Bush administration for catering to "big dirty-power" companies and for failing to take action to reduce CO 2 emissions.' ° l
Although President Bush promised during his first campaign that
he would regulate C0 2 releases, he cited the potential economic
impact of such regulation to defend his inaction shortly after
0 2
taking office.'

96

Greenhouse Polluters Face the Law, supranote 31; see also Stempeck, supra

note 43 (quoting New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer). "Nuisance law is the
traditional law governments use to make polluters clean up." Id.; Shapley, supra
note 25 (quoting Paul M. Bray, a professor in the Government Law Center of
Albany Law School as saying that "it is the traditional legal way of resolving
conflicts based on infringment of one's property or environmental health").
97
Stempeck, supranote 43 (citing analysis by David Guest, a managing attorney
with Earthjustice).
9 Emily Lambert, Spitzer Strikes Again, FORBES, July 21, 2004.
9 Bowman, supra note 21 (quoting Clifford Rechtschaffen, co-director of the
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic at Golden Gate University).
oId. (also quoting Prof. Rechtschaffen, who claims that the filing of the suit is
an example of "people resorting to common law because of an egregious gap"); see
also Bustillo, supranote 18; Post, supranote 26 (noting the argument by deputy
attorney general in California, William Brieger that "[e]ither the Clean Air Act
covers C02 emissions or the states have a right to bring nuisance claims").
" Bustillo, supranote 18 (quoting Frank O'Donnell, the executive director of the
Clean Air Trust in Washington, D.C., an air pollution watchdog group).
' 2Id. (also noting President Bush's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol due to
the "incomplete state of scientific knowledge").
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Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal explains
that legal action is needed because "the federal government has
abdicated its responsibilities."'10 3 However, the federal government
has not ignored the problem; Congress repeatedly has considered
the regulation of CO 2 and has found it to be undesirable."°4
III.

IMPACTS OF REGULATING CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS

A.

Harms of ProposedRegulation

The test for the reasonableness of the interference with
public rights under a theory of public nuisance requires a consideration of the impact that the proposed mandatory reductions of CO 2
will have on the utility companies and their customers. In order to
comply with the proposed injunctions, the power producers would
be forced to switch to more costly natural gas instead of coal, which
would in turn affect other industries. °5 Any new generating units,
even if more efficient, would increase utility costs for consumers. 106
The switch to other fuels such as natural gas and the
subsequent increase in energy prices could drive more manufacturing jobs overseas. 10 7 In the Midwest, which derives sixty-six
103

Spitzer vs. Xcel: Playingat Lawmaking; Regulating CarbonDioxide Isn't an

AG's Role, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 28, 2004, at 34A.
104 Id.; see also discussion infra Part
IV.B.
'o'War Between the States on Climate, supra note 41 (stating that natural gas
produces less CO 2 but is more costly); see also Bob Downing, Utility Balks at
Blame for Climate Change; Ohio'sAEP Says Problem Bigger than Single Firm,
Carbon Dioxide Reduction Efforts Should Be Global, AKRON BEACON J., July
22, 2004, at 4 (noting that there are currently no effective technologies to control
carbon dioxide).
106 Lesser, supra note 2, at 28 (finding that the proposed alternatives in the
complaint "either cost too much or cannot be supplied in sufficient quantities to
provide a viable and economic alternative"); see also Geiselman, supra note 39
(citing the impact on energy prices and the economy feared by the National
Association of Manufacturers); War Between the States on Climate, supra note
41 (claiming that Southern Company will have to raise rates by fifty percent if
they lose the suit).
107 Post, supra note 26, at 4 (citing statements by Pat Hemlepp, AEP's
director
of corporate media relations).
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percent of its power from coal, the transition would make it
difficult for states to offer competitive energy prices to businesses.' °8 The initial cost to Michigan alone is estimated to be
nearly one hundred thousand jobs.0 9
Indiana has a ninety-eight percent reliance on coal-generated
energy, as opposed to the national average of fifty percent.1' 0 The
competitive edge of the state's businesses would be lost if Indiana
had to replace coal-generated power."' The repercussions within
the state would extend beyond the coal industry to others, "including automotive, steel mills, foundries and agricultural ....
Reduction of greenhouse emissions in 2010 to 2000 levels is
estimated to cost between $700 and $1,500 to the average Indiana
household, and the state is expected to lose nine thousand jobs as
a result of companies' financial hardship or migration." 3
The burden of addressing the alleged environmental
problem would be shifted to a small group of investors and
businesses who would be required to bear a disproportionate share
of the costs." 4 Raising the investment costs for regulated and nonregulated power generators would have a "chilling effect on the
115
financial community."

Editorial, PollutionLawsuits Put Michigan'sEconomy at Risk, DETROIT NEWS,
Sept. 13, 2004, at 8A.
109 Id. (noting also that the drive to classify CO 2 as a pollutant could lead to
raised automobile prices and further job losses for the Midwest); see also Truini,
supra note 46, at 3 (pointing out that the Unions for Jobs and the Environment
has filed an amicus brief in support of the utility companies on behalf of 3.2
million workers).
108

110

Schoettle, supra note 39, at 39.

"1 Id.(citing findings by Purdue University's Coal Research Technology Center
demonstrating that coal efficiency and Indiana's four-hundred-year supply have
made Indiana the third cheapest power-generating state).
112 Id.(quoting
Vince Griffin, Indiana Chamber of Commerce Vice President of
Energy and Environmental Policy).
113 Id. (citing a study by Charles River Associates).
114 Lesser, supra note 2, at 28.
115 Id. at 29.
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The lawsuit has been described as "slightly perverse" by the
on Global Climate Control Change.'16 The Pew Center
Center
Pew
is a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization based in Alexandria,
Virginia, which works in conjunction with several power companies to reduce greenhouse gases." 7 Officials at the Pew Center do
not believe that the lawsuit is "a constructive step toward solving
global warming." '18
Proponents of the lawsuit contend that the United States is
the only country in the developed world that is taking no action to
reduce greenhouse gasses." 9 In defending their lawsuit, the
attorneys general claim that increases in energy prices would be
only marginal. 2 ° The state officials point out that any expense is
merely "but a fraction of the cost of coping with the devastation
that could be wrought by global warming."'' However, this
argument does not address the problems of shifting the cost of
a global issue onto a limited number of states and
trying to resolve
22
investors. 1
Dispute Between States

B.

The lawsuit has been characterized as an attack by states
that rely on natural gas or other fuels against the states that
primarily use coal for energy production. 123 Generally, none of the
defendant companies own plants in the states that have filed
suit.'24 The attorneys general filing suit have been criticized for
economic competition than
being more concerned with "regional
' 25
real environmental improvement.'
Schoettle, supra note 39, at 39.

116

Id.

117

11' Id. (referring to comments by Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew Center).
119 Post, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting statements of Tom Miller, Iowa Attorney
General).
120 Id.
121

Applying the Heat, supra note 56 (citing reports by The Wall Street Journal).

122

See supranotes 113-15 and accompanying text.

123

See PollutionLawsuits Put Michigan's Economy at Risk, supra note 108.

" Shapley, supranote 25 (citing one exception: Xcel with one plant in Wisconsin).
125 Bowman, supra note 29 (quoting Scott Segal, the director of an advocacy
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The success of the lawsuit could cripple states that rely on
coal for energy and would devastate the economy of the Midwest. 126
The action of the attorneys general appears even more one-sided
in light of the fact that California, one of the states filing the
action, does not regulate global warming emissions from electric
plants or other businesses within its borders.'2 7 For these reasons,
states like Ohio, where two of the
named utilities are based, have
12
1
lawsuit.
the
in
join
to
declined
This does not mean that all midwestern states are unconcerned about the environmental impact of the emissions. In fact,
Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch met for several hours
with attorneys general of the states filing suit to discuss the
possibility of joining in their action.' 29 However, Hatch decided not
to join the suit because of the progress that Xcel has made in
Minnesota toward reducing power plant emissions while still
increasing energy output. 3 0 Hatch is concerned that a suit at this
point would undermine Minnesota's ability to reach future
resolutions with the power companies.' 3
While Hatch has not totally ruled out the possibility of a
future lawsuit by Minnesota, he is concerned by the differing
group, the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council, which opposes restrictions
by the government on power plant emissions); see also War Between the States
on Climate, supra note 41 (claiming that the action might arise from jealousy by
states which have higher energy costs and more frequent blackouts).
126 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
127 Bowman, supra note 29 (noting, however, that California has led the nation
in efforts to decrease tailpipe exhaust with legislation in 2002 requiring that
auto manufacturers limit the emissions from passenger vehicles sold in the state;
the restrictions will become effective in 2009 and will gradually increase the
reductions through 2015).
121 Ohio's Attorney General,supra note 51 (listing AEP and Cinergy as the
two
Ohio-based utilities).
129 Serres, supra note 40.
2
oId. (citing Xcel's plan to spend $1 billion to convert two Twin Cities coal-fired
plants to natural gas and to add pollution control equipment to another of its
plants in the Twin Cities).
131 "[Y]ou don't negotiate a resolution [to reduce emissions] with a utility, and
then turn right around and sue the company. That would have undermined our
credibility... ." Id. (quoting Attorney General Hatch).
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interests of the states currently involved. During their discussion of
possible remedies, Hatch became alarmed at the possibility of a
demand for full-scale conversion of coal to natural gas, which would
cost billions of dollars and increase energy prices for Minnesotans.' 32
IV.

LEGISLATION THROUGH THE COURT SYSTEM

Robert Reich, former Clinton administration secretary of
labor, declared in 1999 that "regulation is out, litigation is in ....
[T]he era of big government may be over, but the era of regulation
through litigation has just begun."'33 Beyond the debate of whether
power plant emissions of carbon dioxide should be limited lies the
question of whether such should be left to legislation or propounded by the courts.
A.

Policymaking by the Court

This lawsuit has been characterized as a "blatant attempt
to legislate through lawsuits .... It's putting an issue that would
normally be considered by all of Congress in one judge's hands."'34
It is not only the defendant utility companies that are criticizing
the courtroom-driven climate policy;' 35 even the United States
Chamber of Commerce has attacked the attempt to circumvent
federal legislation and policymaking as a misguided shift of energy
and environmental policies to lawyers and judges instead of elected

132

Id. (quoting Hatch as stating that one cannot "jump into a lawsuit" without

first considering the impacts "down the line").
133 Owsiany, supra note 19.
3 Schoettle, supranote 39, at 39 (quoting Angeline Protogere, spokeswoman in
the Indianapolis office of Cincinnati-based Cinergy).
135 See Eight States and New York City Sue, supra note 29 (referring to
statements by Thomas Kuhn, president of the Edison Electric Institute); see also
States Sue over C02, supra note 31 (quoting comments by the National Mining
Association president and CEO, Jack Gerard, who emphasizes the importance
of relying on Congress' ability to consider "a broad and diverse range of public
interests").
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officials.' 36 The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, which
normally is sympathetic to tighter regulations, 3 7 also has stated
that this is an issue that should be reserved for Congress, and not
the courts. 38
The courts are not the right forum to determine what
constitutes a pollutant and to carry out the cost-benefit analysis
139
necessary to determine how much of the "pollutant" to allow.
Regulations are best when enacted by lawmakers because legislators are in the best position to measure regulatory burdens against
competing priorities.' 0 The courts are neutral arbiters of the law;
they are not intended to be super-regulatory bodies, a role that this
lawsuit calls on them to assume.' The traditional process also
ensures accountability by directing such decisions to the policy1 42
makers who ultimately are elected by the voters.
136

US States Open Legal Front in Battle on Global Warming, AGENCE FR.-

PRESSE, July 21, 2004, available at 2004 WL 87621911 (quoting Thomas

Donohue, president of the chamber of commerce, who described the lawsuit as
a "blatant end-run around the Congress and federal and state regulatory
agencies"); see also Geiselman, supranote 39 (quoting the director of the Electric
Reliability Coordinating Council, Scott Segal, in his criticism of the attempt to
"transform a serious court into a debating society for political bluster"); New
York's Greenhouse Gasbags, supranote 47, at 30 (describing the "cynical use of
litigation" in this case as "the height of irresponsibility"); Politics Drives
Emissions Lawsuit, supra note 35 (arguing that if the public really wants
regulation of "greenhouse gases" it should rely on standards set by
knowledgeable regulators, not judges).
137 PollutionLawsuits Put Michigan's Economy at Risk, supra note 108.
' 8Id.(referring to statements by Eileen Claussen, president of the Pew Center).
139 Spitzer vs. Xcel: Playing at Lawmaking, supra note 103.
14oId. (citing the
findings of a panel of the most distinguished economists in the
world, including Nobel laureates such as Robert Fogel, Douglass North and
Vernon Smith, which ranked seventeen government investments based on their
likely worldwide impact on welfare; the three investments for climate change
ranked at the bottom).
' Owsiany, supranote 19 (criticizing the attorneys general for seeking to enact
political agendas through the courts and by circumventing a legislative process
which adopts laws after "consideration of competing interests and weighing the
costs and benefits").
142Id. (arguing
that these checks and balances are fundamental to a democratic
process).
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The inappropriateness of the lawsuit is most apparent in
light of the minimal impact that it will have on global warming
even if successful. In order to affect global climate change, there
must be support by Congress and enforcement by the President
"through international dialogue and federal legislation.' 43
B.

Legislative Finding That Carbon Dioxide Is Non-Hazardous

Supporters of the action against the power companies
contend that states should not be barred by federal preemption
even if carbon dioxide is legislatively determined to not violate the
nation's environmental laws.' The common law approach under
the public nuisance doctrine, however, is not appropriate when
federal legislation has resolved the issue.'45 The Clean Water Act's
requirement of "discharge permits for all types of releases into the
nation's waterways"'146147already has displaced nuisance law in that
area for some judges.
Midwestern states that will be heavily impacted due to their
reliance on coal-based energy are preparing a brief for a consortium of states to oppose the lawsuits against the EPA. 4 ' Michigan
Truini, supra note 46, at 3 (quoting statements by Michael G. Morris,
chairman, president and CEO of AEP, that addressing global climate change
requires "coordinated and meaningful international action that includes
developing nations, not a lawsuit against five companies that generate
electricity"); see also discussion supraPart I.D.
144 Bustillo, supra note 18.
145 See Levy, supra note 65 (noting that federal government domination of "the
legal landscape" makes inappropriate the common law solutions favored by
conservatives and libertarians, despite the fact that common law may be better
tailored to the "unique problems of individual litigants" than legislative solutions
which are "based on an inflexible, command-and-control regime"); see also
Schoettle, supra note 39, at 39 (citing efforts to address cutting of greenhouse
gas emissions by power companies through the Lieberman-McCain Climate
Stewardship Act).
146 Stempeck, supra note 43.
...
Id. (quoting David Doniger, attorney with the NRDC and policy director of
NRDC's climate center).
48
' Id. (describing opposition to suits which demand that the EPA include carbon
dioxide in the list of controlled pollutants).
14'
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Attorney General Mike Cox has described the actions by the
attorneys general initiating the suits as "sheer audacity" in
attempting to force courts to do something that Congress repeatedly has rejected.' 49 Once the federal government has established
that CO 2 limitations are not appropriate, it is not up to the
courts to trump the decision by enacting secondary pollution
regulations. 5 °
In its 1990 amendment to the Clean Air Act, Congress does
not label carbon dioxide as a hazardous air pollutant.' Therefore,
although the utility companies do meet the threshold emission
Id. (noting that, in its 1990 amendment to the Clean Air Act, Congress
declined to add carbon dioxide to the list, and that Congress has also adopted a
law named after Rep. Joe Knollenberg which bars the EPA from circumventing
the Act to regulate carbon dioxide); see also Ohio'sAttorney General, supranote
51 (pointing out that an attempt to regulate CO2 in the fall of 2003 through the
Climate Stewardship Act failed by a 43-55 vote in the Senate); States Sue over
C02, supra note 31 (citing findings by the National Center for Policy Analysis
that Congress has repeatedly established a record of rejecting greenhouse gas
regulation); Stempeck, supra note 44 (quoting statements by the director of air
quality for the National Association of Manufacturers, Jeffrey Marks, that
Congress would have required the EPA to regulate CO 2 if it had found it to be
necessary).
"0 Levy, supra note 65 (adding that it is in the public's best interest to avoid
duplication or conflict between state and federal regulations).
15142 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000); see also § 7408(a), which describes the issuance of
the air pollutant list and the air quality criteria:
(1) For the purpose of establishing national policy and secondary
ambient air quality standards, the Administrator shall within 30
days after December 31, 1970, publish, and shall from time to
time thereafter revise, a list which includes air pollutant(A) emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare;
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results from
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before
December 31, 1970 but for which he plans to issue air quality
criteria under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2000). The 'Administrator' is defined as the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (2000).
149
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quantities governed by the Act, 5 2 they are not limited by the Act
as long as CO 2 is not classified as a hazardous airpollutant.
The national ambient air quality standards are established
by the EPA administrator to "protect the public health.' 1 53 The
administrator must review the list periodically and "where
appropriate, revise such list by rule, adding pollutants which
present, or may present, through inhalation or other routes of
exposure, a threat of adverse human health effects... or adverse
environmental effects whether through ambient concentrations,
bioaccumulation, deposition, or otherwise.' 5 4
Additionally, any individual can petition the administrator
to consider a pollutant for addition to the list of hazardous air
pollutants.5 5 The guidelines for this process require that any such
152

42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2000).
The term "major source" means any stationary source or group
of stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under
common control that emits or has the potential to emit
considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more
of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any
combination of hazardous air pollutants. The Administrator may
establish a lesser quantity . . . for a major source than that
specified in the previous sentence, on the basis of the potency of
the air pollutant, persistence, potential for bioaccumulation,
other characteristics of the air pollutant, or other relevant
factors.

Id.
153

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000); see also § 7409(b)(2) which states that
Any national secondary ambient air quality standard. . . shall
specify a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of
which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such
criteria, is requisite to protect the public welfare from any
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the
presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air.

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (2000).
154

42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).

15'

The petition guidelines are enumerated in § 7412(b)(3):
(A) Beginning at any time after 6 months after November 15,
1990, any person may petition the Administrator to modify the
list of hazardous air pollutants under this subsection by adding
or deleting a substance .... Within 18 months after receipt of
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petition "shall include a showing by the petitioner that there is
adequate data on the health or environmental defects of the
pollutant or other evidence adequate to support the petition.' ' 6
Additionally, the administrator cannot add a pollutant to the list
unless the alleged pollutant is "known to cause ormay reasonably
be anticipated to cause adverse effects.' ' 7
The EPA has concluded as recently as 2003 that CO 2 does
not constitute an air pollutant under the Clean Air Act. 5 ' The
plaintiffs in this suit, who see the EPA as a political extension of
the current administration, consider this an example of the Bush
administration's "bur[ying] its head in the sand" on global
warming.15 Any individual, however, may commence civil action
against the administrator of the EPA if that plaintiff can allege a
failure of the administrator to perform an act or duty under the
Clean Air Act. 60 In fact, the EPA's determination that CO 2 is not
a pollutant already is being challenged by eleven states and
fourteen environmental groups.' 6 '
Although this lawsuit also will have to deal with the
likelihood that CO 2 leads to the asserted harms, it will not be as
broad in scope as a public nuisance suit, and therefore more

petition, the Administrator shall either grant or deny the
petition by publishing a written explanation of the reasons for
the Administrator's decision....
(B) The Administrator shall add a substance to the list upon a
showing by petitioner or on the Administrator's own
determination that the substance is an air pollutant and that
emissions, ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation or
deposition of the substance are known to cause or may
reasonably be anticipated to cause adverse effects ....
42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3) (2000).
116 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3)(A) (2000).
157 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3)(B) (2000).
158 Bustillo, supra note 18.
159

Id.

160 42

U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000) (stating that "district courts shall have jurisdiction
without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties
...to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty").
161 See discussion supra note 18.
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appropriate for a courtroom. Unlike a public nuisance law suit, a
challenge to the EPA's non-classification of CO 2 as a pollutant will
merely focus on whether the administrator has given proper
consideration to the known or reasonably likely effects of CO 2
emissions and their accumulation in the atmosphere. 6 2 On the
other hand, the public nuisance claim will entail much broader
policy considerations such as: (1) the impact on the power companies and on the population of the states which rely on them for
electricity; (2) the benefits, if any, of reducing the global emissions
of CO 2 by one-tenth to two percent; and (3) a balancing of the
benefits against the harms.'63
C.

CongressionalPreemption

The power companies contend that the policy question
64
belongs in the legislative arena rather than in the courtroom.
Additionally, the power companies contest the arguments by the
plaintiffs that inaction by the federal government has opened the
door for civil actions based on principles of state common law.'65
The utility companies claim that the affirmative decision by the
EPA to not classify CO 2 as a hazardous pollutant is not equivalent
to government inaction;'6 6 it is a legislative determination which
preempts state law.
Federal preemption of state law is a principle founded on the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution,
which provides that "[1]aws of the United States" made in support
of the Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.... "167 However, the
initial presumption by the courts is that "the historic police powers
of the States [are] not to be superseded by... Federal Act unless
162

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.

163 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
164

Id.

165
166
167

See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra note 103 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also United States v. Wagoner County Real

Estate, 278 F.3d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 2002).
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that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'68 Therefore,
the "purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case.' 69
The primary determination of Congressional intent is the
language of the statute. 70 In Cook v. Rockwell InternationalCorp.,
273 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (D. Colo. 2003), the court was faced with a
public liability action for nuisance under state common law that
was brought against a private party under the Price-Anderson Act,
a federal statute governing nuclear energy. 171 In its finding that
Congressional legislation did not preempt state tort law, the court
found that Congress had indicated its intent not to preempt state
law by providing in the Act that "the substantive rules for decision
in [public liability] actions shall be derived from state law .... 172
The language of the Clean Air Act, like the language
considered in the Price-Anderson Act, does not restrict private
rights under state common law.' 73 Power companies can attempt
to differentiate the exclusion of CO 2 from the Clean Air Act from
cases like Cook by claiming that the holdings in such cases were
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
'69Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
171 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486 (noting that other
factors for consideration are "the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole
as revealed not only in the text but through the reviewing court's reasoned
understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its
surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law")
(citation ommitted).
171 Cook, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1178-79.
172 Id. at 1188. The Court held that:
If Congress had intended to change this law and preempt state
law relating to nuclear safety issues, it could have omitted the
direction to apply state law .... employed standard preemption
language barring resort to state standards of care or at least
provided that state law would govern unless inconsistent with
"federal law." It did none of these things.
Id. at 1189.
17' 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2000) states that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict
any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
18

common law to seek enforcement... or to seek any other relief. ..

."
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only that individuals can claim damages under state common tort
law against a party which violates a federal regulation; the cases
do not provide states with the power to declare something hazardous that Congress specifically has declined to regulate as such.
Courts, however, have specifically noted that states are presumed
to have the power to enforce liability through common law unless
Congress specifically demonstrates the intent to preempt the state
1 74
law.
The Clean Air Act is more indicative of Congress' intent not
to preempt state law than the Price-Anderson Act. Section 7416 of
the Clean Air Act states that, with the exception of certain state
regulation of moving sources:
[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the
right of any State or political subdivision thereof to
adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation
respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of air
pollution; except that if an emission standard or
limitation is in effect under an applicable implementation plan ... , such State or political subdivision
may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or
limitation which is less stringent than the standard
175
or limitation under such plan or section.
Therefore, the case for non-preemption of the presumed right of
states to enforce damages for a public nuisance is even stronger in
the present case than it was in other cases where the courts found
that plaintiffs were not precluded by federal legislation from seeking
common law remedies. 176 This is bolstered by the Congressional
findings and declaration of purpose in Section 7401 of the Act which
state that "air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or
elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2000).
176 See generally Cook, 273 F. Supp. 2d. at 1185-87, 1190-96 (discussing
174

175

preemption, the states' roles, and common law remedies).
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produced or created at the source) and air pollution control at its
source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments. '177
Even if the statute does not explicitly reflect Congressional
intent to preempt state law, such an intent "may also be implied
if state law actually conflicts with federal law because 'it is
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements' or 'state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."'178 The Supreme Court addressed this question
directly in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984),
with facts very similar to those in Cook. In Silkwood, the Court
held that there was no conflict or frustration of Congressional
purpose in the application of state tort law to award punitive
damages in a public liability action brought under the PriceAnderson Act.'79 As in Cook, the Court found that the language of
the Act maintains the intent to allow state tort law to coexist with
federal legislation, but the Court also found that, absent Congressional language to the contrary, there is nothing to suggest that it
is physically impossible for a private party to comply with both
federal nuclear safety requirements and state common laws
80
standards of care.1
In Cook, the court did address the "tension between the
conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the
federal law and the conclusion that a state may nevertheless award
damages based on its own law of liability."''1 Citing the Supreme
Court's decision in Silkwood, the court held that Congress' decision

177
178

42 U.S.C. § 7416(a)(3).
Cook, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,

79 (1990)).

Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256.
'80 Id. at 257; see also Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1444-45
179

(finding that there is no conflict between common law enforcement and federal
law, especially where Congress says that it does not intend to bar states from
imposing more stringent standards).
181 Cook, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
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not to explicitly preempt state law of negligence or torts is a
regulatory consequence that Congress has the power to elect."8 2
D.

The Clean Air Act-A Model Solution

Although the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act
intentionally did not impose regulation of CO 2 , the Act provides a
model for regulating gases through legislation, rather than
through litigation."13 The Act establishes a "cap-and-trade" system
which allows the government to set an overall national emission
limit.'
Potential polluters have the option of reducing their
emissions to comply with the guidelines, or they can purchase
credits from others who can achieve the lower emissions more
efficiently;"8 5 the market forces, therefore, produce the benefit
sought by the regulators at the lowest cost to the industry, the
consumer, and society. The ability and incentives to find the
"lowest cost sources of pollution reductions" does not exist in
command-and-control regulation which doesn't provide the credit
allocation allowed by the Clean Air Act." 6
The main criticism of such a system is that, while it may
curb national emissions, it does not prevent localized contamination by an industry that purchases credits from others." 7 However,
C0 2 emissions do not have a local impact, and could be reduced
through a national program which focuses on the reduction of
aggregate emissions.' 8

182 Id.

Lesser, supranote 2, at 24 (arguing that historically environmental litigation
leads to "unnecessarily costly and ineffective policies, no matter how noble the
underlying cause" and that "[t]here are better ways to achieve environmental
goals-in this case reducing C02 emissions-than by ill-conceived lawsuits").
4 Id. at 26 (focusing on two major air pollutants: sulfur dioxide and oxides of
nitrogen).
183

185

Id.

186 Id.

18

1

Id. (citing the controversy over a proposal to use the cap-and-trade system to

reduce mercury emissions).

188 id.
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CONCLUSION

The complex policy question of whether to regulate CO 2
must be addressed in a legislative forum, rather than in a single
courtroom. The myriad factors involved, as well as the different
interests and competing priorities throughout the country, are
best addressed by lawmakers.
There is historical precedent for the use of public nuisance
law to resolve environmental problems." 9 Nuisance law has been
extended to allow one state to sue a party in another state to enjoin
them from causing the plaintiff further harm. 9 ' While there are
numerous historical examples of the use of public nuisance
common law for the enforcement of such goals,' 9 ' most cases
involve clear interference with pollutants that hinder the enjoyment of one's land. Additionally, the doctrine has not been used
previously to address a global environmental issue; rather, it has
19 2
focused on regional disputes.
The first element to be proven by the plaintiffs is that the
CO 2 emissions of the named power companies interfere with the
public rights of the citizens in the states which have initiated the
action.'9 3 The plaintiffs likely will be able to meet the burden of
proof-preponderance of the evidence-that CO 2 emissions are
reasonably likely to cause global warming.'9 4
The plaintiffs, however, also must prove that the emissions
of the defendant are significant enough to cause the alleged harms,
and that the impacts of global warming would not take place
absent the actions of the named power companies.' 95 The plaintiffs
most likely will not be able to prove causation in light of the
increasing alternate sources of CO 2 emissions, such as natural
emissions, emissions from automobiles, and the industrial growth
See
190 See
191 See
192 See
193 See
194 See
195 See
189

supra Part II.B.
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
discussion supra Part II.B.
supra notes 76, 82 and accompanying text.
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
discussion supra Part I.A.
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of third-world nations.'96 Additionally, the power companies can
show that any benefit197is immediately negated by the growth of
developing countries.
The plaintiffs contend that even a partial solution is a step
in the right direction, and that any reduction in emissions will help
to mitigate the harms of global warming.' However, this argument would not be enough for plaintiffs to prevail when the court
assesses the final element of the claim.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs must prove more than an interference with the public rights of their states' citizens; they must also
prove that the defendant utility companies are acting unreasonably. 199 To prevail, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
potential environmental impact of the emissions by the utility
companies is not outweighed by the concrete benefits of their
activity. 00
The harms of limiting emissions to the extent requested in
the claim will have an immediate financial impact on the named
utility companies and on the citizens of those states which rely on
power from said defendants.2"' This indirectly would affect the
states' industries and their labor force as costs of business increase
and jobs are sent outside of the affected states.20 2
The impacts on the national economy and on the varying
regional priorities are better addressed by Congress than by a
court. This is not to say, however, that the plaintiffs lack a remedy
when the EPA does not concur with plaintiffs' determination that
CO 2 is a hazardous air pollutant. Any individual can petition the
EPA to consider incorporating CO 2 as a hazardous air pollutant.2 3
If that fails, an individual can initiate a civil action against the

196
197
198

199
200
21

202
203

See
See
See
See
See

discussion supra Part I.B.
supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
discussion supra Part II.A.
supra note 71 and accompanying text.

See supra Part I.D.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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administrator of the EPA for failure to amend20 4the list of air
pollutants in accordance with the Clean Air Act.
If CO 2 is found to be reasonably likely to cause the alleged

harms, Congress will be better suited than a court to consider what
level of emissions will maximize the benefits provided by the
utility companies while minimizing the harms of the emissions.
The Clean Air Act's 'cap-and-trade' system has already proven a
successful model for the use of market forces to achieve lower
emissions more efficiently. °5

204
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See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part IV.D.

